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This book explores the idea that the meanings of words are like biological species. On 
Richard’s view, the meaning of a word in a group’s language is what he calls its interpretive 
common ground or ICG. The ICG of ‘cousin’ in the English of the residents of Boston is the 
set of presuppositions about the term they normally make and are expected to make: “that 
cousins are relatives, that cousins are the children of your folks’ sisters and brothers, that 
people have cousins but dogs and bumblebees do not etc.” (49) Meanings qua ICG-s are like 
species in being historical, process-like entities that can gradually change over time.  
 The book is divided into six chapters. In chapter 1 Richard frames the overall project 
as growing out of a desire to reconcile Quine’s view that any meaning-related, supposedly 
analytic claim like ‘cats are animals’ can be given up without changing the meaning ‘cat’ with 
the common-sense view that the notion of meaning is perfectly acceptable. Chapter 2 
dismantles internalist attempts to resuscitate an epistemologically interesting notion of 
analyticity. These two chapters form more something like the background to the view to be 
offered, rather than being part of the view itself. 
 In chapters 3-4 Richard starts developing the view of meanings qua ICG-s. In the first, 
he sets out the basics while simultaneously defending the traditional view of philosophy as 
conceptual analysis. In the second, he starts discussing meaning change and how it relates to 
questions of sameness of reference and extension over time. 
 In chapter 5 Richard discusses how meanings qua ICG-s are related to propositional 
attitude ascriptions. As he himself puts it, this chapter is again somewhat of a digression from 
the main thread. Finally, chapter 6 continues the discussion of meaning change, looking at 
concrete cases and how they could be explained, starting with the simpler examples of 
‘skyline’ and ‘gay’ and ending with the staple contested cases of ‘rape’ and ‘marry’. 
Many of the chapters contain further brief, relatively self-sufficient discussions of 
specific philosophers’ recent arguments that are more or less loosely related to the central 
thread: Russell on analyticity (Ch. 1), Chalmers on conceptual continuity (Ch. 2), Cappelen 
on intuitions (Ch. 3), Field on deflationism (Ch. 4), Dorr & Hawthorne on speech reports (Ch. 
5), and Haslanger on conceptual engineering (Ch. 6). 
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As should be evident from the above overview, the discussion is wide-ranging, moves 
criss-cross in different directions, and contains many digressions. The downside of the 
breadth is that the view of meanings qua ICG-s and of meaning-change is left at a somewhat 
impressionistic level and is hard to pin down precisely. Partly because the exposition of its 
tenets is spread out between the chapters and partly because of the conversational style, the 
reader has to do quite a bit of work themselves to piece together something that can be 
compared to alternatives and critically assessed. Below is my best attempt, together with some 
questions that arose. 
Meanings and concepts. Words have meanings in languages. But what is meant by 
‘meaning’? Richard is commendably explicit in making clear that he’s interested in meaning 
in the sense of what competent speakers grasp, “the anchor of linguistic competence” (3, 49). 
On the other hand, the relevant notion of competence is left entirely intuitive in a way that is 
potentially problematic. In any case, as we saw above, a word’s meaning qua the anchor of 
competence is supposed to be its ICG. 
Richard takes a word’s meaning to be equivalent to the concept it expresses (50, 53-
54). In saying this, he must primarily be thinking of concept-words like ‘cousin’ and ‘pasta’. 
But aren’t there important differences between the notions of linguistic meaning qua the 
anchor of competence and the notion of concept, however construed? There are some words 
such as ‘hello’ and ‘ouch’ which clearly have meanings, but which nobody takes to express 
concepts. And there are some words like ‘I’ which have a single meaning in English, but 
which plausibly express a different concept in each of our mouths. This is not to mention 
further problems raised by context-sensitive and polysemous words and their complex 
relations to concepts. 
Is the view of meaning qua ICG on offer supposed to cover words like ‘hello’ and ‘I’ 
as well or is Richard actually primarily interested in concept-words or even concepts 
themselves? It is not totally clear. On the one hand, he says that in cases like ‘hello’ the ICG 
is exhausted by information about how the word is used (is, in fact used? Or how it is correct 
or permissible to use it like Kaplan, to whom Richard refers to, would have it?). On the other 
hand, he grants that a lot of what he has to say, especially about meaning change, sounds 
much more plausible when put in terms of concepts (128). 
Richard also thinks that we need to add “pragmatic” information to the ICG of words 
along the lines of: “in uttering ‘snow’ the speaker is referring to snow, in uttering ‘is white’ 
the speaker is ascribing the property of whiteness to what she referred to with ‘snow’; to do 
this sort of thing – refer to x and go on to ascribe y to it - is to assert that x is y.” (71)  But 
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already this seems to drive a wedge between the notions of meaning and concept. Presumably 
no such information is included in characterization of the relevant concepts. Furthermore, one 
might wonder whether such information might not be sufficient for an account of the 
specifically *linguistic* meanings qua anchors of competence with the relevant words. If I tell 
you that in Estonian, ‘lumi’ is for referring to snow, ‘on valge’ is for predicating whiteness 
and to do that is to say that snow is white, what more do you need to know to be able to use 
‘Lumi on valge’ in Estonian? Thus, one might wonder whether the sort of rich descriptive 
information Richard takes to be part of the ICG of ‘cousin’ might be better thought to have 
something to do with the concept COUSIN or even something further like a conception of 
cousins, a set of beliefs or presuppositions about them. 
From Idiolects to Shared Languages. Words have meanings in languages. But what is 
meant by ‘a language’? Richard’s explanatory starting point seems squarely individualist. He 
starts from idiolects, but unlike Davidson in his anti-language papers, he, like Lewis, works 
up to the notion of a shared language (Davidson 1986, Lewis 1975). Take individual speakers 
and their idiolects which partly consist of a lexicon, a set of words. The speakers make certain 
assumptions about the use of these words which take the form of descriptive claims a la 
‘cousins are parents siblings progeny’. Such a set of assumptions he calls the word’s use 
(133). Speakers form groups that share a language in the sense that their uses are coordinated 
in forming the word’s ICG. This explains why they can converse with each other without 
problems. 
One might wonder what difference, if any, there is between the idiolectal uses 
construed as a set of assumptions and shared language meanings construed as ICG-s? Aren’t 
both just sets of presupposed information? What does the fact that the assumptions are a 
matter of common ground consist in (an explicit comparison with Lewis would’ve helped 
perhaps…), and what does it really add? 
 Contrast the much more common, social order of explanation shared by philosophers 
from Dummett to Burge to Kaplan. That view starts with the notion of public language as a 
historically embedded social practice. Public language meanings are thought to be importantly 
different from anything an individual’s words could possess on their own, usually having to 
do with their normativity. On a socialized version of a Richard-style view, the ICG could be 
understood in terms not of assumptions that speakers in fact make, are disposed to make or 
that it is conventionally regular to make, but that one is required to make, to speak correctly. 
How does Richard’s view of ICG compare to this normative alternative? 
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Consider the other side of the coin, competence in the shared language. Richard says 
that to be a competent speaker of a shared language one must have the “right sort of cognitive 
contact” (68) with the ICG. What is it to possess that? The simplest view is that it is to make 
the right assumptions. But Richard acknowledges that this is not necessary. If Ruben is 
fanatical about cousins and thinks that only men can be cousins then he is not assuming “C: 
cousins are parents’ siblings’ progeny” (69). But that doesn’t bar him from being competent 
with ‘cousin’. As Richard puts it: “To understand a word, it suffices to know how it’s 
supposed to be used; knowing that doesn’t require that one use that word in that way.” (69). 
On a social view you would cash out ‘supposed’ in terms of knowing the rule you have to 
follow to speak correctly. However, despite some off-hand references to rules of use (17, 87), 
Richard tells us in a footnote that he doesn’t think there are any such rules but just regularities 
in use (157). The force of ‘supposed’ is instead to be understood in terms of Ruben making a 
yet-another assumption, a higher-order one: “D: Speakers who use ‘cousin’ expect their 
audience to recognize that in using the word they presuppose C” (69). Since individuals 
presumably wouldn’t make such higher-order assumptions without being embedded in the 
group, this is where Richard’s view goes beyond mere overlap of uses and becomes genuinely 
social, while stopping short of normativity.   
It’s an interesting proposal, but as you can see, piecing it together takes some 
interpretive work and one would have wished for a more detailed explicit discussion of the 
details vis-à-vis established alternatives in terms of Lewisian conventions and social rules. 
Species-Analogy. Meanings are like species in how they change. Species are 
population lineages, collections of individuals diachronically related by descent and 
synchronically related by “some species-making relation” (98). What sorts of linguistic 
entities are supposed to be analogous collections or individuals? Again, Richard starts from 
individuals’ lexicons and the words they contain. The lexical entries are individuals with a 
history. My ‘cousin’ is mine and yours is yours, but each was acquired in some way, usually 
from other people. The word ‘cousin’ in the shared language is a collection of these entries 
and thus it also has a history. The same goes for its meaning. I have my use and you have 
yours. The meaning qua ICG of ‘cousin’ in the shared language of some group is a collection 
of these uses and has a history as well. Thus, both the words themselves and their meanings 
are constituted by collections of individuals and have a history. They are species-like in two 
respects. First, there can be some acceptable variation in the individual lexical entries (e. g. 
pronunciation, ICG) while these still constitute the same word (100). Second, they can 
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gradually change some of their properties over time while not ceasing to exist. This brings us 
to our final topic. 
Meaning Change and Referentialism. Meanings are like species in how they change. 
One sort of meaning change is a matter of a word losing its old meaning and acquiring a new 
one. For example, ‘meat’ used to mean ‘solid food’, but now means something like ‘animal 
flesh eaten as food’. This is the type that comes with change of topic or subject. In the past we 
used the word to talk about one thing, now it has changed its meaning and we use it to talk 
about something different. Richard calls this change of meaning. However, he also wants to 
make room for the possibility of meaning change that allows retention of topic – change in 
meaning (106). 
I hinted above at a view that would separate the properly linguistic or meaning-related 
(e. g. ‘lumi’ is used to refer to snow) and the conceptual (the concept SNOW) (compare 
Glanzberg 2018). On such a view it would be natural to think that the only sort of meaning 
change is change of meaning and any putative change in meaning is really change in concepts 
or something further. This is not how Richard thinks of things since he equates meanings and 
concepts qua ICG-s. On his view, there can be change in meaning since some of the rich 
descriptive claims that are part of ICG can be shed and new ones added, without the topic 
changing.  
What does it take for there to be no change of meaning despite changes in meaning? In 
other words, when does meaning stay the same? Richard considers a view he dubs 
Referentialism, which holds that sameness of meaning/concept over time can be understood in 
terms of sameness of reference and argues against it. Take ‘pasta’ in the mouth of English-
speakers in the mid-19th century when it was thought that pasta is necessarily made of wheat 
compared to ‘pasta’ in the mouth of English-speakers today who think that pasta can also be 
made out of rice, seaweed etc. Richard wants to say that there has been no change of meaning 
in ‘pasta’, but there has been change in meaning/concept qua ICG. However, he also claims 
that there has been a change of reference. To my ear, this sounds bizarre. If there’s been just 
change in meaning which is supposed to come with retention of topic, how could reference 
have changed? Doesn’t topic = reference = the kind of foodstuff, pasta? But what Richard has 
in mind instead is that ‘pasta’ has changed its extension, it now applies to a lot more than it 
did before. But this makes the argument against Referentialism feel a bit straw-manish. 
Referentialists, among whom Richard seems to include Soames, think that sameness of 
meaning over time = sameness of topic over time, but presumably they wouldn’t think that 
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this is a matter of mere sameness of extension. Extension obviously changes over time for all 
sorts of reasons that have nothing to do with meaning. 
One might go further and doubt most of Richard’s claims about changes in meaning or 
concept. Richard seems to think that it’s obvious that ‘marry’ has recently undergone a 
change in meaning because more and more people now think that people of the same sex can 
marry. To me, this seems false. I don’t think the requirements for specifically linguistic 
competence with the English word ‘marry’ have changed one bit between 1900 and now. But 
let’s get to more neutral ground and ask whether even “the” concept MARRIAGE has changed. 
Why think this, rather than thinking that the only things that have changed over time and that 
can differ wildly between different people are the associated conceptions, sets of beliefs or 
presuppositions about the topic? Richard doesn’t tell us, but I think many people will find this 
the most crucial question facing the meaning/concept=ICG-picture.  
I hope that the above has left you with the impression that this book contains a fresh 
and exciting, if a bit raw and underdeveloped, perspective on a number of topics related to 
meaning, concepts, and how they change. It can be profitably read and reflected on for a long 
time. It is Richard’s first step in a new, more foundational direction, and we can only eagerly 
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